Límites jurídicos de la responsabilidad penal en estados de inconsciencia voluntariamente provocados en el sistema penal ecuatoriano

Abstract

The overall objective of this research is to analyze the legal limits of criminal liability in cases of voluntarily induced unconsciousness within the Ecuadorian criminal law system, based on the question of whether it is legally legitimate to shift the assessment of culpability to the earlier point in time when the individual retained full capacity. The study is based on the premise that Article 24 of the Comprehensive Organic Criminal Code excludes criminally relevant conduct in cases of complete unconsciousness, but the legislature expressly regulated only intoxication doe to alcohol or other substances in Article 37, leaving unresolved other mechanisms through which a person may voluntarily place themselves in a state of unconsciousness, such as sleep deprivation, dissociative states, or the combined use of substances. To address this question, a legal-dogmatic study was conducted with a qualitative approach, a descriptive-analytical scope, and a non-experimental design, through an analysis of the Constitution, the Comprehensive Organic Criminal Code, and specialized legal doctrine on criminal imputability, culpability, and the doctrine of actio libera in causa. The analysis yielded three interpretive criteria that allow the assessment of criminal liability to be shifted to the prior act when genuine voluntariness, objective foreseeability of the outcome, and a sufficient subjective connection between that act and the subsequent offense are present, without the need for immediate legislative reform. It is concluded that these criteria provide grounds supporting the proposed hypothesis, which is interpretive and dogmatic in nature rather than empirical. The case law search conducted did not identify any Ecuadorian judicial decisions applying these criteria.